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JOHN BUR ID AN AND NICHOLAS OF AUTRECOURT 
ON CAUSALITY AND INDUCTION
B y  J . M. M. H. THIJSSEN*
The names of John Buridan (1300-after 1358) and Nicholas of Autrecourt 
(1300-after 1350) are often associated with the so-called Ockhamist statu te of 
1340 a t the University of Paris. For a long time the discussion centered upon 
the question: Was this statu te directed against Ockham or Autrecourt? Puz­
zling also was the part Buridan played, who presumably was rector a t the time 
th a t the statu te  was promulgated. Should he, as an alleged ‘Ockhamist,’ be 
accused of patricide or did he defend Ockham against the attacks of Autre­
court?1
It cannot be denied th a t some fundamental differences of opinion existed 
between Buridan and Autrecourt. As the central topic of this paper I have 
selected their difference of opinion on induction and causality because it re­
* Research for this paper was made possible by financial support from the Netherlands 
Organization for Pure Scientific Research.
1 E. A. Moody, ‘Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of A utrecourt,’ Studies in Medieval Phi­
losophy, Science, and Logic (Berkeley 1975) 127-61, options for Autrecourt. R. Paque, Das 
Pariser Nominalistenstatut (Berlin 1970) and, more recently, F. B ottin, La scienza degli Occa- 
misti (Rimini 1982) 36 are of the opinion th a t the sta tu te  was directed against Ockham. T. K. 
Scott, ‘Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan and Ockhamism,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy
9 (1971) 15-43 is of the opinion th a t ‘neither Nicholas nor Buridan should be regarded as an 
Ockhamist in his theory of knowledge.’ He does not discuss the statute. W ith the publica­
tions of Courtenay and Tachau this controversy now seems to have come to an end. Cf. W. J. 
Courtenay-K. H. Tachau, ‘Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation a t Paris, 
1339-1341,’ History of Universities 2 (1982) 53-96; and W. J . Courtenay, ‘The Beception of 
Ockham’s Thought a t the University of Paris,’ in Preuve et raison a VUniversite de Paris (edd. 
Z. Kaluza & P. Vignaux; Paris 1984) 43-64. These authors have situated the 1340 statu te 
among a number of other statutes, all of which have to do with the m aintainance of discipline 
a t the university. This sta tu te  is not concerned with specific philosophical positions, bu t with 
styles of reasoning, and it is difficult to argue th a t the practices proscribed in the body of the 
document are in accordance with those of Ockham. In addition, the external evidence asso­
ciating the 1340 sta tu te  with Ockhamism is very flimsy. The rubric ‘S tatutum  facultatis de 
reprobatione quorundam errorum Ockhanicorum’ is an interpolation. The references in the 
Procurator’s Book of the English-German nation and in an oath formula of 1341 were proved 
to be references to quite another sta tu te  which is lost. This lost statute, promulgated in 
January-February  1341, contained prohibitions against the ‘scientia Okamica.’ W ithout 
going further into this question, it suffices to say th a t it was directed against a group of 
members a t the English Nation and was related to issues such as Ockham’s views on univer- 
sals, his reinterpretation of the categories, and the effects on the understanding of physics. It 
had nothing to do with Ockham’s theological opinions.
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veals something about their concept of science, th a t is, about the possibility of 
achieving certain knowledge of reality. First, their views on causality will be 
discussed, then those on induction.
Some aspects of our subject have been treated by Anneliese Maier. Against 
her opinion I will argue th a t the differences between Buridan and Autrecourt 
lie not so much in the degree of certainty which has to be attached to inductive 
knowledge, but rather in the more fundamental problem of causality. It is 
precisely because of their different views on the relation between cause and 
effect th a t Autrecourt and Buridan appraise inductive knowledge differently.2 
Induction is only possible if a more or less regular behavior of natural agents is 
assumed. By elucidating Buridan’s views on causality, we may provide the 
broader context of his treatm ent of induction.
In addition, I want to make it clear th a t it is very unlikely th a t Buridan was 
carrying on a controversy with Autrecourt. In most treatm ents of the relation 
between Buridan and Autrecourt — whether in connection with the 1340 stat­
ute or not — it is taken for granted th a t Buridan had explicitly Autrecourt in 
mind when refuting a certain line of reasoning.3 Although the same line of 
reasoning does occur in Autrecourt and plays a central role in his doctrine, I 
nevertheless think th a t Buridan was not referring to it. The way Buridan 
reproduces this argum entation seems to exclude this possibility.4
Finally, I may make a small contribution to the solution of some problems 
which remained unsolved in an article by Scott.5
2 According to Maier’s interpretation, Autrecourt was the one who banned the experientia 
from the realm of evident knowledge. B ut due to the intervention of Buridan, induction was 
rehabilitated. Cf. A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphiloso­
phie (Rome 1955) 387-88, 392-93 and ‘Das Problem der Evidenz in der Philosophie des 14. 
Jahrhunderts ,’ in her Ausgehendes Mittelalter II (Rome 1967) 391-93.
3 This opinion can be found in Bottin, La scienza 123, 135; Maier, ‘Das Problem’ 391; 
Moody, ‘Ockham, B u r id a n .. .’ 149-50; Scott, ‘Nicholas’ 31; E. Serene, ‘Demonstrative Sci­
ence,’ in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (edd. N. K retzm ann, A. Kenny, 
J . Pinborg; Cambridge 1982) 515.
4 Bottin, Moody, and Scott all have concentrated on B uridan’s theory of knowledge of 
substances and have taken this theory to be a refutation of A utrecourt’s views. I am far from 
denying th a t there exists a difference of opinion on this subject between the two authors, but
I doubt whether this established divergence of itself is sufficient reason to conclude th a t 
Buridan was carrying on a controversy precisely with Autrecourt. In contradistinction to the 
authors mentioned above, I have concentrated on the arguments which Buridan reproduces 
(in the same tex t as discussed by the authors mentioned above) of his opponens (whoever th a t 
may be) before refuting them. To my mind they do not correspond with those of Autrecourt. 
It should be noted th a t the chronology of the works of Autrecourt and Buridan is of no help 
here.
5 Scott, ‘Nicholas’ 37 remarks th a t he ignored the problem of knowledge of causal generali­
zations by induction: ‘the main reason for this was simply th a t I have not been able to get 
clear just w hat B uridan’s position is regarding such knowledge.’ By the way, Scott seems not 
to have used the studies of Maier.
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I. Ca u s a l i t y
Basic to the teaching of Nicholas of Autrecourt is the opinion th a t all evident 
knowledge must be reducible to the primum principium, the principle of non­
contradiction. An inference yields evident knowledge only when the affirma­
tion of its antecedens and the negation of its consequens are contradictory. This 
means th a t the antecedent and the consequent — or, still better, what is signi­
fied by the antecedent and the consequent — must be identical, ‘because if this 
were not the case, it would not be immediately evident th a t the antecedent 
and the opposite of the consequent cannot stand together w ithout contradic­
tion.’6 It is within the context of this theory of evident knowledge th a t Autre­
court launched his attack  on causality, th a t is, on the relations which are 
supposed to exist between causes and their effects. The fundamentals of his 
critique were well analysed by J. R. W einberg.7
Autrecourt maintained th a t there are no logical reasons th a t posit an evident 
relation between a cause and an effect. Thus, the inference ‘Ignis est approxi- 
m atus stuppe, et non est impedimentum; ergo calor erit’ is not evident. Be­
cause the antecedent and the consequent are distinct, it is not contradictory to 
state th a t there is no heat. However, if we interpret the proposition in a way 
in which the antecedent and consequent are identical, the argument is merely 
verbal, because the antecedent is interpreted in such a way th a t it implies the 
consequent.8
The above argument is taken from A utrecourt’s second Letter to Bernard of 
Arezzo. The same line of reasoning may be found in his Letter to Aegidius. In 
connection with Aegidius’ remark th a t natural agents, under proper circum­
stances, cause the existence of their effects, Autrecourt replies :
(A) Dico hie, quod, si per agentia naturalia intelligatis: ‘Ista agentia, que sunt 
approximata passivis et non impedita sunt, ponunt suas actiones esse,’ dicendo 
quod optime sequitur: Agens naturale est approximatum passivo et non est 
impedimentum, ergo est actio. Sed dico, quod non est evidens evidentia de­
scripta alicui, quod in rerum universitate sint talia agentia, ymo nec quod sint 
ponibilia. Nam demonstratis omnibus, que sunt requisita ad effectus, potero 
sustinere sine aliqua contradictione, que posset inferri contra me, quod effec­
tus huiusmodi non erit.
6 This is the tex t of the fifth corollary in Nicholas’ second Letter to Bernard o f Arezzo. For 
the Latin tex t cf. J . Lappe, Nicolaus von Autrecourt: Sein Leben, seine Philosophie, seine 
Schriften (Munich 1908) 8.29-34.
7 J.R . Weinberg, Nicholas of Autrecourt (New York 1969), who (18-19) translates the pas­
sage cited in n. 6.
8 For the Latin tex t see Lappe, 11.29-12.11. For example, when the antecedent is interpret­
ed to mean ‘fire is productive of heat if it is near a combustible substance and there is no 
impediment, and it is next to the flax which is combustible and there is no im pedim ent.’ Cf. 
Weinberg, Nicholas 34-35.
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(B) Item, in concursu causarum potero rationabiliter credere vel dubitare sal­
tern, utrum ibi sit aliquod agens, cuius actio sit necessario requisita ad positio- 
nem talis effectus, et per consequens non debeo credere, quod omnibus istis 
rebus positis necessario effectus debeat esse necessitate tali, quod sit contra- 
dictio alio modo se habere, ut ex premissis satis patet.9
In the first part of the argumentation (A) the point is th a t the inference from 
cause to effect is either tautological or not. If tautological, we have no indica­
tion th a t there is really something like a causal connection. If not, the antece­
dent (which expresses the cause) and the consequent (which expresses the 
effect) are distinct and it is not contradictory to assert th a t the cause exists 
and the effect does not.10
I want to stress — perhaps superfluously— th a t Autrecourt with this last 
claim is not pointing a t the so-called contingency of the effects. It was a 
common doctrine in the th irteenth  and fourteenth centuries th a t agentia natu- 
ralia operate with necessity, but th a t their effects may be prevented. W ith 
such agents it is not contradictory to say th a t the cause exists and the effect 
does not because the latter might have been impeded per accidens by some 
other cause or because God has miraculously intervened in nature.11 Christian 
theology required the belief in several kinds of divine intervention, th a t is, in 
several exceptions to the Aristotelian explanation of nature. The best-known 
examples of such supernatural events were the existence of the accidents of 
bread and wine w ithout their proper subject in the Sacrament of the Eucha­
rist; the angel of Tobias who took temporarily the form of a human being 
(rendering it impossible to prove from effects like eating, drinking, etc., th a t 
the formal cause of th a t body is the human soul); and, finally, the three chil­
dren who were comitted to the flames by king Nebuchadnezzar, but not 
burned, due to the miraculous intervention of God.12 In all these cases the 
effect had been impeded by divine intervention.
A utrecourt’s claim, however, is much stronger, because he explicitly ex­
cludes such an impediment (‘non est im pedimentum’), and declares th a t the 
effect may, nevertheless, not exist. We cannot achieve logical certitude about 
the existence of necessary relations between cause and effect, because, as we 
have seen, knowledge of one thing (cause/effect) is never sufficient for evident 
knowledge of another thing (effect/cause).
9 Cf. Lappe, 29.1-18. A literal translation of this passage may be found in Weinberg, 
Nicholas 48-49.
10 Cf. Weinberg, Nicholas 48-49.
11 A. Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert (Rome 1949) 222-23.
12 Cf. Weinberg, Nicholas 90, where some other examples are provided. The other examples 
are borrowed from L. Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d’Ockham (Paris 1958) 41 
(Ockham) and from F. Oakley, ‘Pierre d ’Ailly and the Absolute Power of God,’ reprinted in 
his Natural Law, Conciliarism, and Consent in the Late Middle Ages (London 1984) 65 (Pierre 
d ’Ailly).
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A utrecourt’s argumentation here revolves around discursive knowledge of 
distinct things. In this respect his point is new. I do not agree with Weinberg 
when he declares th a t ‘this point was anticipated by Ockham.’13 The argument 
which is found in Ockham’s Commentary on the Sentences, Book I prologue 
q. 9, concerns prediscursive knowledge:
(Notitia incomplexa unius rei non causat notitiam incomplexam alterius rei). 
Primum declaratur per experientiam, quia quilibet experitur in se quod quan- 
tumcumque cognoscat intuitive et perfecte aliquam rem, nunquam per hoc 
cognoscit aliam rem nisi praehabeat notitiam illius alterius rei.
His point is th a t intuitive and perfect knowledge of a thing never suffices for 
the knowledge of another thing, unless one has previous knowledge of th a t 
other thing. Applied to the knowledge of a cause this means:
cognoscere causam sub ratione causae praesupponit notitiam illius rei quae est 
effectus.14
Ockham’s point may be expressed^— somewhat anachronistically — as follows: 
the assignment of an event to a cause is a ‘theory-laden’ undertaking.15 It 
presupposes knowledge of the effect which, in our conceptual framework, is 
connected with th a t cause. By designating a certain something as a cause, one 
has already structured reality, because one cannot speak of cause, unless one 
has — at least tacitly  — some notion of the effect. In other words, experience 
of causal relations is a condition of knowing a thing sub ratione causae. It is 
precisely in connection with this point th a t induction plays a role in this dis­
pute. I will return to this aspect a little later.
The second part of the argumentation (B) in Autrecourt’s Letter to Aegidius 
must be seen against the background of the doctrine th a t God may be the sole 
cause of any effect. The epistemological significance of this hypothesis is th a t 
inferences th a t are not evident in the first place (such as the existence of 
secondary effects from secondary causes) do not become evident through addi­
tional qualifications, such as: God did not supernaturally produce any effects, 
bu t nature took its common course. It is a line of reasoning which Autrecourt 
had elaborated in his first Letter to Bernard of Arezzo:
Nam quando aliquis non est certus de aliquo consequente nisi mediante aliquo 
antecedente, de quo an ita sit, sicut significat, non est certus evidenter, quia 
nec illud est notum ex terminis nec experientia, nec ex talibus deductis, sed 
tantum est creditum: talis non est evidenter certus de consequente.16
13 J. R. Weinberg, Ockham, Descartes and Hume (Madison, Wise. 1977) 55 n. 6.
14 William Ockham, Sententiae I Prologus q. 9 (Opera theologica I [edd. G. G. Gal & S. 
Brown; St. Bonaventure 1967] 241.1-4, 242.3-4, 243.18-244.3.
15 Cf. N. R. Hanson, Observation and Explanation (London 1971) 28-39.
16 Lappe, 3.28-33.
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The qualification as to whether the referent of the conclusion was naturally or 
supernaturally produced does not alter the certainty of the conclusion. Our 
knowledge remains the same and, as Autrecourt had already established, we 
possess no evident knowledge of causal relations. Moreover, it is impossible to 
know when the qualification should be made, th a t is, when we should suppose 
th a t God has miraculously intervened or th a t nature has followed its communis 
cursus.11
John Buridan elaborated his views on causality in his commentary on the 
Physics, Book I q. 4: ‘U trum  in omni scientia ex preexistenti cognitione princi­
piorum, causarum et elementorum contingit alia scire, scilicet principiata, cau­
sata et elem entata?’18 The title already shows th a t this question will say a 
great deal about causality. The question refers to the well-known teaching of 
Aristotle th a t we have scientific knowledge of an object only if we know the 
principles, causes, and elements of th a t object (Phys. 184al-16). It is precisely 
within the context of this question th a t Buridan tries to give a reply to what 
has been regarded as the argument of Autrecourt. Buridan restates this argu­
m ent in the arguments quod non, th a t is, in the objections to his own position:
Item revertor ad arguendum quod non posset fieri notum unum ex alio, quia 
de uno ad aliud non est consequentia evidens, propter hoc quod consequentia 
non est evidens nisi secundum reductionem ad primum principium, quia pri­
mum principium fundatur in contradictione, et contradictio debet esse eius­
dem de eodem et secundum rem et secundum nomen; unde si a et b sunt alia 
ab invicem, nunquam esset contradictio a esse et b non esse. Igitur non est 
evidens consequentia dicere ‘a est, ergo b est,’ et sic de quibuscumque aliis 
quantumque propinquam habentibus habitudinem ad invicem.19
Although a similarity with Autrecourt’s line of reasoning cannot be denied, I 
hope to show, in my analysis of B uridan’s reply, th a t it is very unlikely th a t he 
had Autrecourt in mind.20
17 Cf. Weinberg, Nicholas 36-37, 49-50, and 91-92.
18 Johannes Buridanus, Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik  (Paris 1509; repr. Frankfurt 
1964) (hereafter cited as In Phys.) I q. 4 (fol. 4va).
19 In Phys. I q .4  (fols. 4vb-5 ra). This passage has been translated by Moody, ‘Ockham, 
B uridan’ 150.
20 This line of reasoning against the necessity of causal efficacy also occurs in the Arabic 
tradition. Cf. Averroes’ ‘Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis’ in the Latin Version 
of Calo Calonymos (ed. with an Introduction by B. H. Zedler; Milwaukee, Wise. 1961) 
403-405: ‘Ait Algazel. Copulatio autem inter id quod reputatur ad modum causae, et id quod 
reputatur causatum, non est necessaria apud nos. Sed omnia duo, quorum hoc non est illud, 
nec illud hoc, et affirmatio unius non includit affirmationem alterius, nec negatio unius inclu­
dit negationem alterius, non est ex necessitate esse unius esse alterius, nec ex necessitate 
privationis unius u t privetur alterum .’ This work (in Arabie: Tahafut al-Tahafut) is m eant to 
be a refutation of Algazel’s Tahafut al-Falasifa. Averroes’ procedure is to cite passages from 
Algazel’s Tahafut and then to state his arguments for or against his position. I t is from one
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Buridan starts his determinatio by observing th a t his quaestio implies two 
further questions: (1) May we infer knowledge of one thing from knowledge 
of another thing? (2) W hat kind of things are causes or principles and what 
kind are effects?
Phys. I q. 4 fol. 5ra: (A) Ista quaestio et rationes ad eam adducta implicant in se 
plures difficultates. Una difficultas est utrum ex notitia unius potest fieri 
notitia alterius . . . .  (fol. 6ra) (B) Alia difficultas, scilicet cum dicimus ex causis 
vel principiis scire principiata et causata, quae res sint illae causae vel illa 
principia, et quae res sint etiam illa principiata vel causata.21
In connection with the first question (A) Buridan sets out to refute the claim 
th a t all knowledge should be reducible to the principle of non-contradiction 
— th a t is, to the only principle which is, according to Autrecourt, perm itted in 
science. Buridan first tries to refute this claim for incomplex knowledge, th a t 
is, knowledge on a prediscursive level. The discussion is restricted to the knowl­
edge of substances. W ithout going into too much detail, it is clear th a t Buri- 
dan’s account of the question does not match the way Autrecourt had posed 
it. Buridan describes the problem as follows. Some people assert th a t no 
incomplex knowledge may be obtained from other incomplex knowledge, un­
less by way of inference. B ut an inference is solely from complex knowledge to 
complex knowledge, th a t is, from propositions to other propositions.22 As a 
corollary these people infer:
Quod nullam substantiam cognoscimus notitia incomplexa, quia non venimus 
in notitia substantiarum nisi per notitiam accidentium; igitur in virtute ali­
cuius consequentiae, quae non est nisi complexorum.23
The ‘quidam’ of Buridan seem to have held the position th a t we have no 
intuitive knowledge of substances because knowledge of substances is discur­
sive. This, however, is not the position defended by Autrecourt. In the first 
place, A utrecourt denied explicitly th a t we have an intuitive cognition of sub­
stances. Furthermore, he also denied th a t we have discursive knowledge of 
substances, ‘quia ex una re non potest inferri quod alia res sit.’ We are not 
allowed to make a ‘jum p’ from the existence of the accidents (which we per­
such citation th a t our passage was taken. The tex t cited here is from a Renaissance version. 
The earliest translation into Latin dates from 1328 (by Calonymos I). A Latin edition of 
Alagazel’s Tahafut is not available, but there exists an English translation by A. Kamali, Al- 
Ghazali: Tahafut al-Falasifah (Lahore 1958) 185-86. — A similar line of reasoning may also be 
found in Ockham. Cf. above.
21 Cf. In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5ra).
22 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5ra): ‘Quaedam de incomplexa dicunt quod nulla notitia incomplexa 
fit per aliam, nisi virtute consequentiae. Sed consequentia non est nisi complexi ad 
complexum; igitur’ etc.
23 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5ra).
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ceive) to the existence of the substance.24 This is a first indication th a t Buri- 
dan might not have had Autrecourt in mind when writing this quaestio.
Having treated incomplex knowledge, Buridan then proceeds to complex 
knowledge:
His autem visis de conceptibus incomplexis, aliqui etiam de complexis opinan- 
tur quod non est possibile scire hoc esse per illud esse, si hoc et illud sint alia ab 
invicem.25
He reproduces two arguments of his anonymous opponents. The first objec­
tion is th a t only a conclusion which is reducible to the primum principium  is 
evident. B ut it is not possible to find a middle term  in a syllogism where the 
existence of a is inferred from the existence of b. If one takes the proposition la 
is b’ as a middle, the existence of a has already been assumed and the question 
begged.26
In the second objection which Buridan reproduces, it is argued th a t in a 
syllogism one should use all the premisses. B ut the proposition ‘a is b’ could in 
this way never become a premiss in a demonstration for the existence of a, 
because the conclusion ‘a is’ is immediately inferred from ‘a is b,’ w ithout the 
help of the other premiss.27
Basically the problem is th a t the proposition ‘a is V is a necessary premiss for 
any inference which should be reducible to the principle of non-contradiction. 
For in this premiss the identity of the antecedent (b) and the conclusion (a) is 
stated. Both arguments, however, try  to show th a t ‘a is b’ is unsuited to 
function as premiss in a logical inference of the existence of a from the exist­
ence of b. In this way, B uridan’s opponents have succeeded in proving their 
point th a t such inferences are invalid. Their reasoning is thus quite different 
from the position taken by Autrecourt.
I now turn  to B uridan’s reply. His first conclusion seeks to make clear the 
way in which the proposition ‘a is b’ may function in a syllogism. It is of no
24 Lappe, 11.25-12. Cf. Weinberg, Nicholas 38-40 for an exposition of A utrecourt’s views.
25 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5va).
26 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5va): ‘... et quia videtur eis quod impossibile sit demonstrare aliquam 
conclusionem in qua affirm atur de aliquo subiecto hoc verbum “est” secundum adiacens, quia 
non potest inveniri medium quod esset notius de illo subiecto quam hoc verbum “est.” Unde 
statim  videtur quod in sillogismo esset petitio principii, verbi gratia volo demonstrare quod a 
est et sillogismo sic: “b est” et “a est 6” ; igitur “a est.” Constat quod in minori propositione 
ego iam accipio quod a est. Non enim possum scire quod a est b, nisi prius vel simul sciam 
quod a est.’
27 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5va): ‘Item, in sillogismo demonstrativo nec ad maiorem sine minore, 
nec ad minorem sine maiore debet sequi conclusio gratia formae, quia superflueret alia pre- 
missa. Sed ad istam “a est b” sequitur quod a est; igitur illa propositio “a est 6” non potest 
esse premissa ad sillogisandum demonstrative quod a est.’
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interest to us here. The other three conclusions are more promising in connec­
tion with the conflicting positions on causality and induction which we are 
considering. Buridan’s general procedure here is to undermine the basic as­
sumption of his anonymous- opponents th a t there is bu t one principle in sci­
ence, th a t it is only from the primum principium, th a t certain knowledge may 
be inferred. As we have seen, this is also the position defended by Autrecourt.
I illustrate Buridan’s procedure with a few examples. In one conclusion he 
maintains th a t we have demonstrative knowledge of conclusions which are not 
reduced to the first principle. If we see a man, we know th a t he has a heart. 
The antecedent is clear from sense-perception; the consequent is certain when 
we have dem onstrated th a t man cannot live without a heart.28 In this way we 
have inferred knowledge of the existence of b from knowledge of the existence 
of a.
In a rather amusing anecdote in his commentary on the Metaphysics, Buri- 
dan even casts doubt upon the certainty of the first principle. He asked some 
old women whether they could be sitting and not-sitting a t the same time. 
They said, of course, th a t they could not. He then pointed out to them th a t 
God is almighty and asked whether they believed th a t God could make them 
sit and not sit a t the same time. They answered: We do not know.29
B ut the key passage for our problem is B uridan’s second conclusion in ques­
tion 4 in his commentary on the first book of the Physics. This conclusion 
provides a preamble to his views on induction. His argument is th a t we know 
many premisses of science without having reduced them to the first principle. 
Knowledge of these premisses of a demonstration is attained by sense-percep­
tion, memory, or experience.30
28 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6ra): ‘Q uarta conclusio est quod in quibusdam per istam propositio­
nem “a est” non solitarie sed cum alia premissa ego possum demonstrative scire istam conclu­
sionem “b est,” licet a sit aliud quam b, et b aliud quam a. Verbi gratia, non est tibi notum ad 
sensum quod cor est, sed tibi est notum ad sensum quod homo est; igitur tu  argues sic: “Si 
homo est, cor est; sed homo est; igitur cor est.” Minor patet ad sensum, et maior erit nota 
quando demonstratum erit quod non potest homo vivere sine corde.’ Cf. also Maier, Metaphy­
sische Hintergründe 394 for a transcription.
29 Johannes Buridanus, Kommentar zu Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Paris 1518; repr. Frank­
furt 1964) (hereafter cited as In Metaph.) II q. 2 (fol. 9vb): ‘Unde quamvis nullus mente sanus 
negaret primum principium, tam en potest de eo habere formidinem. Hoc enim expertus fui. 
Petivi enim a pluribus vetulis, utrum  scilicet crederent quod simul possent sedere et non- 
sedere; statim  dicebant quod erat impossibile. E t tunc petivi ab eis: “Nonne creditis quod 
Deus posset hoc facere?” Statim  responderunt: “Nescimus, Deus posset omnia facere, et quod 
impossibilia Deum posse facere credendum est.’” Cf. also Maier, ‘Das Problem ’ 392 n. 48 for a 
transcription.
30 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5vb): ‘Secunda conclusio contra illos est, quod non oportet omnem 
praemissam demonstrationis fieri notam et evidentem per reductionem ad primam princi­
pium. Multa enim principia demonstrationum fiunt nota nobis per sensum vel per memoriam 
vel per experientiam, absque hoc quod oporteat ea aliter demonstrari, sicut habetur secundo 
Posteriorum .’
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I I .  I n d u c t i o n
This last remark of B uridan’s refers to the way we may attain  knowledge of 
the indemonstrable principles which are proper to a specific science. According 
to the Aristotelian notion of science, such principles serve as premisses in a 
demonstrative syllogism. Scientia (emarrj/urj) is, for Aristotle, knowledge of the 
demonstrated conclusions; knowledge of the principles is referred to as intellec- 
tus (vovg). The problem is: In what way do we attain  knowledge of the first 
principles? They cannot be demonstrated, for this would imply an infinite 
regression. At the same time, Aristotle wanted to avoid the assumption of a 
number of so-called basic tru ths which are not demonstrated, for this would 
lead to dogmatism.31
In Posterior Analytics II 19 Aristotle dealt with this problem a t some length. 
He explicitly denied th a t knowledge of the first principles is innate. It must be 
obtained by man. Modern interpretations differ as to the way in which this 
knowledge is achieved according to Aristotle. His remarks seem to point to a 
process of intuitive induction.32 The medieval commentators on Aristotle were 
much clearer on this point than Aristotle himself. Buridan deals with the 
problem in his commentary on the Metaphysics, Book II quaestio 2: ‘Utrum 
principia sint nobis habita naturaliter.’ Through sense-experience we recognize 
the principle ‘This fire is warm .’ This sense-perception is stored in memory, 
and through repeated recollections of such perceptions we judge th a t even the 
fire we have not sensed is warm. This last judgem ent is founded on expe­
rience.33 For ‘experientia est ex multis memoriis consimilium prius sensatorum 
iudicare de alio sim ili occurente.’34
31 An outline of Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative science may be found in J . Barnes, 
‘Aristotle’s Theory of D em onstration,’ Phronesis 14 (1969) 123-54 and in S. P. Marrone, 
William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century 
(Princeton 1983) 20-23, 251-56. The assimilation of the Posterior Analytics is treated in the 
survey-articles of B. G. Dod, ‘Aristoteles Latinus,’ in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy (edd. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J . Pinborg; Cambridge 1982) 45-80 and C. H. 
Lohr, ‘The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle,’ op. cit. 80-99.
32 Cf. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (translated with notes by J. Barnes; Oxford 1975) 
248-60 for the status quaestionis and for an interpretation of Ch. 19. See also W. Hess, ‘E rfah­
rung und Intuition bei Aristoteles,’ Phronesis 15 (1970) 48-83 for an account of the role of 
induction in Aristotle’s works.
33 In Metaph. II q .2  (fol. 9va~b): ‘E t ideo sciendum est, sicut determ inat Aristoteles in fine 
Posteriorum, quod aliqua sunt principia indemonstrabilia accepta per sensum, ut quod iste 
ignis est calidus. Alia autem accepta per memoriam, u t quod ignis quam heri tetigi fuit 
calidus. E t aliqua sunt accepta per experimentum, u t quod iste ignis quam scilicet ego 
< n o n >  (ed. nunc) tango est calidus.’ This passage has also been transcribed in Maier, 
Metaphysische Hintergründe 388-89.
34 This definition may be found in In Metaph. I q. 8 (fol. 7va). It is illustrated by the same
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B ut this process still concerns singular principles like the knowledge th a t this 
fire is warm. Buridan must explain how the ‘jum p’ to a universal principle is 
made. In order to explain the way in which we arrive a t knowledge of first 
principles like ‘All fire is warm ,’ or ‘Bhubarb cures cholera,’ he posits the 
natural inclination of our intellect to tru th  (inclinatio naturalis ad veritatem). 
On encountering such a universal principle, the intellect assents to it—al­
though a t times only after long deliberation — because of our natural inclina­
tion to tru th .35
Buridan concludes th a t this process of gathering experience is nothing other 
than the method of induction:
Experientia ex multis sensationibus et memoriis deducta non est aliud quam 
inductio in multis singularibus, per quam intellectus, non videns instantiam 
nec rationem instandi, cogitur, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, 
concedere propositionem universalem.36
These remarks about knowledge of first principles are scattered over a num­
ber of questions. Buridan expounds his ideas systematically in his Quaestiones 
on the Posterior Analytics, bu t his exposition does not deviate from the posi­
tion sketched in the passage I have quoted. I may perhaps refer to one passage 
which provides some additional information. In Book II, question 11 of his 
commentary on the Posteriora Buridan stresses th a t knowledge of the princi­
ples is not discursive. Although the intellect uses the method of induction, this 
method is not in itself sufficient. It is by its own power th a t the intellect 
apprehends the first principles, precisely because it is naturally inclined to 
them .37
It was very common in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to explain 
knowledge of the first principles of science by a non-discursive, mental process 
of induction. We find an account of this process not only in the commentaries
example as was discussed above. The definition is Aristotelian (M etaph. 980a27-981al6; 
Anal. Post. 100a4-9).
35 In Metaph. II q. 2 (fol. 9vb): ‘Postea etiam sunt aliqua principia universalia, que propter 
experimenta in multis singularibus consimilibus concedunt ab intellectu propter naturalem 
inclinationem intellectus ad veritatem ....’ Cf. also In Metaph. I q. 8 (fol. 7va): ‘ergo per suam 
inclinationem naturalem  ad veritatem  consurgit ad consentiendum universali propositioni.’
36 In  Phys. I q. 15 (fol. 19ra). Transcription also in Maier, ‘Das Problem ’ 393.
37 A copy of B uridan’s Quaestiones on the Posterior Analytics was discovered by Prof. H. 
Hubien (Liège). I am very grateful th a t he put his transcription of this tex t a t my disposal. 
The question which is particularly relevant with regards to our subject is Book II q. 11 
(‘U trum  notitia primorum principiorum sit nobis innata’). From this question I quote the 
following passage: ‘Ideo principiorum indemonstrabilium non est scientia proprie, sed eorum 
est habitus qui vocatur “ intellectus,” non quia sit ipsamet potentia intellectualis, sed pro 
tanto quia non v irtu te aliorum intellectorum assentit eis, sed v irtu te propria tanquam  est 
naturaliter determ inatus . . . .  E t ideo, licet intellectus indigeat inductione, tamen illa non est 
sufficiens ad determinandum intellectum, nisi intellectus per suum naturam  esset ad hoc 
inclinatus et determ inatus’ (transcription of Prof. Hubien).
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on the Posteriora by Robert Grosseteste38 and Thomas Aquinas,39 but also in 
the theological works of Duns Scotus and William Ockham.40
It is interesting to observe th a t Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan seek to vali­
date the method of induction. As we have already seen, for Buridan the ulti­
m ate ground for justifying the tru th  of the inductively known principle was an 
‘inclinatio naturalis ad veritatem.' This becomes also very clear from a passage 
from his commentary on the Metaphysics (Book II q. 1). In one of the argu­
ments quod non it is argued th a t inductively known principles are false,
quia experientiae ad concludendum universale principium non habent vim, 
nisi per modum inductionis in multis, et nunquam ex inductione sequitur 
universalis propositio, nisi sit inductum in omnibus singularibus illius univer­
salis, quod est impossibile.
Buridan meets this argument with a reference to the intellect’s natural inclina­
tion to truth:
Ad aliam, quae dicit quod experientiae non valent ad concludendum princi­
pium universale, dico quod non est illatio gratia formae, sed intellectus per 
naturalem inclinationem suam ad verum, praedispositus per experientias, as- 
sentit universali principio.41
Scotus and Ockham appeal to a special principle to establish the tru th  of an 
inductive generalization. Scotus describes this principle as a self-evident prop­
osition in the soul to the effect th a t ‘Quicquid evenit u t in pluribus ab aliqua 
causa non libera est effectus naturalis illius causae.’ If in many cases an effect 
of a certain kind b follows upon a natural cause of a certain kind a, we may 
conclude th a t all a’s can produce b’s. Ockham assumed the following principle 
‘Causae eiusdem generis sunt effectivae effectuum eiusdem generis vel eiusdem 
rationis,’ or, in other words, ‘Like causes have like effects.’ As soon as we are 
certain th a t a particular cause a is responsible for the production of the effect 
b, we may conclude — by way of the above-mentioned principle — th a t all a’s
38 Cf. Marrone 251-87 for a lucid exposition of Grosseteste’s theory. J . R. Weinberg, Ab­
straction, Relation and Induction (Madison-Milwaukee 1965) 133-36 has drawn attention to 
the influence of the Arabic views on induction in the West. Especially Avicenna has been 
im portant in this respect. His theory came to be known via Algazel’s Logic. Cf. C. H. Lohr, 
‘Logica Algazelis: Introduction and Critical Text,’ Traditio 21 (1965) 268.334-50 and 274.553-59.
39 The commentary of Thomas has been translated into English by F. R. Larcher, Thomas 
Aquinas: Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle (Albany, N.Y. 1970).
40 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I dist. 3 pars 1 q. 4 (Opera Omnia III [Vatican 1954] 
141-44); William Ockham, Sententiae I Prologus q. 2 (Opera Theologica I edd. G. G. Gal & S. 
Brown [St. Bonaventure 1967] 87 and 90-96). In both cases the context is once again knowl­
edge of the first principles.
41 In  Metaph. II q. 1 (fol. 8va).
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can cause b. According to Ockham’s account it m ust be certain th a t this 
particular a, and not some other cause, caused b.42
Both Scotus and Ockham were of the opinion th a t their maxims about cau­
sality are self-evident. Scotus’ theory was attacked by A utrecourt in his Exi- 
git. A utrecourt’s point is th a t Scotus’ maxim is merely verbal. It provides a 
definition of a natural cause, but it is not possible to know when an agent will 
be a natural agent.43 The imposition of the term  causa naturalis to something 
is an a posteriori conclusion — th a t is, it depends on the experience of causal 
routines, and it is impossible to be certain th a t these same routines will hold in 
the future.44 In other words, our experience informs us only of frequency, not 
of invariability.
Furtherm ore, Autrecourt denies th a t we have experience of causal relations. 
We only have experience of conjunction. Repetition of these experiences may 
provoke a conjectural habit (habitus conjecturativus), the probable expectation 
th a t in the future the same conjunction will be observed.45 Nicholas’ reasoning 
here is consistent with his position in the second Letter to Bernard. There too 
he argued th a t we do not even have probable experience of causal nexus, 
because
aliquid non habet noticiam probabilem de aliquo consequente virtute alicuius 
antecedents, de quo non est evidenter certus utrum consequens fuerit ali- 
quando simul cum antecedente.46
It seems th a t Autrecourt does allow induction, but it is a completely differ­
ent kind of induction than the other three authors have in mind. His theory of 
induction is based upon the observation of the repetition of event-pairs. F ur­
42 Cf. Baudry, Lexique 119-20. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation and Induction 139-50 ana­
lyzes Scotus’ and Ockham’s theories on induction. According to him Scotus’ theory may be 
compared with Mill’s method of agreement, and Ockham’s theory with Mill’s method of 
difference.
43 It is the same line of reasoning we already encountered in the Letters.
44 Nicholas of Autrecourt, Exigit (ed. J . R. O’Donnell, Mediaeval Studies 1 [1939] 237 
41-47): ‘Cum probatur quod certitudo per propositionem quiescentem in anima quae est 
“illud quod producitur u t in pluribus a causa non libera est effectus ejus naturalis,” quaero: 
Quid appellas causam naturalem ? Vel illam quae produxit praeteritum  ut in pluribus et 
adhuc producet in futurum  si duret et applicetur? E t tunc minor non est scita, esto quod 
aliquid sit productum ut in pluribus; non est tam en certum an sic debeat esse in futurum .’ 
This passage has been analysed in Maier, ‘Das Problem ’ 390-91 and in Weinberg, Nicholas 
69-71. More or less the same criticism holds for Ockham. Experience of the regularity of 
nature is needed for expressing causal routines in a universal proposition. There is, however, 
no guarantee th a t the same routines will hold in the future.
45 Nicholas of Autrecourt, Exigit (237 39-41): ‘Tertia decima conclusio est quod de scitis 
per experientiam illo modo quo dicitur sciri “rheubarbarum  sanat choleram” vel “adamas 
a ttrah it ferrum ,” habetur solum habitus conjecturativus, non certitudo.’
46 Lappe, 13.6-8. Cf. Weinberg, Nicholas 111-12.
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thermore, according to Autrecourt induction provides only probable knowl­
edge. It is only with probability th a t we may anticipate th a t the same event- 
pairs will repeat themselves. Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan believed th a t some­
thing can be learned from induction, th a t induction can provide an insight in 
the causal interconnections of phenomena.
If we now return to B uridan’s views, recalling the context in which he made 
his statem ents, we observe th a t he does not adequately reply to his anonymous 
opponents. In his commentary on the Physics I, the fourth question arose out 
of the fact th a t some people recognized only one principle of science, the 
primum principium  — a claim which rendered knowledge of causal relations 
impossible. Since Buridan was unable to accept this consequence, he a t­
tem pted to refute his opponents by showing th a t the first principle is not the 
only principle of scientific knowledge. As we have seen, one of his arguments 
was th a t there are, as a m atter of fact, many principles in science and th a t 
these principles are known by induction, th a t is, by sensory perception, mem­
ory, and experience. B ut here Buridan is begging the question, because in his 
account of the inductive process, he presupposes the possibility of knowledge 
of causal relations. It is exactly this kind of knowledge which is excluded by 
the claim th a t all evident knowledge should be reducible to the first principle. 
The presupposed knowledge of causal relations was his reason for attacking 
this claim in the first place.
A petitio principii would be, however, avoided, should it turn  out th a t Buri­
dan does not attach the same degree of certainty to inductively known princi­
ples as to the first principle. His answer to this question may be found in the 
questions on the Metaphysics, Book II q. 1 (‘Utrum  de rebus sit nobis possibilis 
comprehensio veritatis?’). There he posits a third kind of comprehensio veritatis 
which is relevant to this issue:
Alio modo comprehensio veritatis accipitur pro adhaesione vel assensu quo 
assentimus vel adhaerimus propositioni vere, et adhuc constat quod hoc est 
nobis possibile.
And the question is further specified:
Utrum talis assensus veritatis sit nobis possibilis cum certitudine,47
Buridan seems to m aintain th a t the certainty of our assent is of two kinds: 
simpliciter and secundum quid or ex suppositione (communis cursus naturae). 
The first kind of evidence appears when one is necessitated to assent to a 
proposition, because one cannot do otherwise. An example of such a proposi­
tion is the first principle.48 The second kind of evidence is valid, only if the
47 In  Metaph. II q. 1 (fol. 8vb).
48 In  Metaph. II q. 1 (fol. 8rb): ‘E t vocatur evidentia propositionis simpliciter, quando ex 
natura sensus vel intellectus homo cogitur <sive necessita tu r >  (Ed: sine necessitate), ad
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miraculous intervention of God is excluded. B ut if we assume the common 
course of nature, we may confidently assent to propositions like ‘All fire is 
warm ,’ and this kind of evidence is sufficient for the principles and conclusions 
of natural science.49 W ith this qualification, the possibility of certain knowl­
edge is guaranteed:
Ideo conclusum est corollarie, quod aliqui valde mali dicunt volentes interi­
mere scientias naturales et morales, eo quod in pluribus principiis et conclusio­
nibus non est evidentia simplex, sed possunt falsifican per casus supernaturali- 
ter possibiles, quia non requiritur ad tales scientias evidentia simpliciter, sed 
sufficiunt predictae evidentiáe secundum quid, sive ex suppositione. Ideo be­
ne dicit Aristoteles secundum huius, quod non in omnibus scientiis mathema­
tica acribologia est expetenda. E t quia iam apparuit quod omnibus predictis 
modis firmitas veritatis et firmitas assensus sunt nobis possibiles, ideo conclu­
dendum est quod querebatur, scilicet quod nobis est possibilis comprehensio 
veritatis cum certitudine.50
We may conclude th a t Buridan has avoided a petitio principii, because he 
only claims a conditional evidence for the principles proper to natural science, 
whereas evidentia simpliciter is required for the first principle. It is doubtful, 
however, whether Buridan was aware th a t he came close to begging the ques­
tion, because his reason for introducing evidentia secundum quid alongside evi­
dentia simpliciter has nothing to do with the reservations we made with regard 
to the validity of his argumentation.
In introducing conditional evidence, he was necessitated by the requirements 
of Christian theology: there had to be room for miracles. At the same time, 
conditional evidence was introduced to express the fact th a t natural effects 
take place ut in pluribus. That is th a t they take place on the assumption of the 
common course of nature, which may be impeded so th a t the effect is produced 
ut in paucioribus. The standard example for such effects was th a t men are 
born with ten fingers ut in pluribus, but th a t men have been known to have 
been born a t times — ut in paucioribus or a casu — with eleven fingers. It was 
a common medieval doctrine, already implicit in Aristotle, th a t nature can be 
assumed to run its common course and th a t chance occurrences may be ex­
cluded, if one wishes to know something of causes and future events.51
assentiendum proposition! ita, quod non potest dissentire, et huiusmodi evidentia secundum 
Aristotelem conveniret primo principio complexo, u t patet quarto huius.’
49 Cf. In  Metaph. II q. 1. These passages have also been transcribed and discussed by 
Maier, ‘Das Problem’ 398-403.
60 Cf. foregoing note.
51 For this reason I do not quite agree with the interpretation th a t Bottin, La scienza 135 
has given of the evidentia ex suppositione: ‘... egli [Buridan] pero difende la dottrina occamista 
del possibile intervento divino nelle leggi di natura e di consiguenza costruisce una scienza 
puram ente congetturale e ipotetica,’ and (op. cit. 210-11): ‘Infatti, Giovanni Buridano, ben­
ché cerchi di evitare con ogni cura le ingerenze a livello scientifico della teologia e benché
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The introduction of evidentia secundum quid or ex suppositione was based on 
a long tradition. It may be found in Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William 
Ockham, and many more medieval authors.52 As we have seen, Autrecourt 
drew an im portant methodological consequence from the theological excep­
tions: it is impossible to know when the supposition of the common course of 
nature is validly applied.53 B ut in the passages known to me, Buridan shows 
no signs of acquaintance with this line of reasoning. For this reason and 
because of our conclusions from B uridan’s argumentation in his commentary 
on the Physics I q. 4, it is my conviction th a t Buridan did not know the doc­
trines of Nicholas of Autrecourt in any detail. The only resemblance I have 
been able to establish is th a t Buridan was in touch with the line of thought 
th a t evident knowledge of the existence of b may not be inferred from the 
knowledge of the existence of a if a and b are distinct, which also occurs in the 
works of Autrecourt. Buridan even considers this argument as threatening the 
possibility of knowledge of causal relations, but he seems to be unaware of the 
subtle ways Autrecourt used this basic idea in his attacks on causal knowledge.
cerchi di smorzare molte delle polemiche relative appunto alla possibilità di uno diretto 
intervento divino nelle cause naturali, in realta elabora egli stesso una epistemologia nella 
quale il “casus supernaturaliter possibilis” e continuamente preso in considerazione.’ To my 
mind, the case of a divine intervention is too much stressed here. G. Federici-Vescovini, 'Arti' 
e filosofia nel secolo X I V  (Florence 1983) 35-36 makes a connection between the suppositio 
naturalis and induction which is not altogether clear to me. Her way of presenting the 
problem gives the impression th a t ‘supposizione naturale’ has something to do with ‘supposi­
zione del communis cursus naturae.’
52 Cf. Maier, Die Vorläufer 219-50 (Notwendigkeit, Kontingenz und Zufall). Aquinas’ posi­
tion on this point is discussed in A. Van Hove, La Doctrine du miracle chez Saint Thomas et son 
accord avec les principes de la recherche scientifique (W etteren-B ruges-Paris 1927), in K. J a ­
cobi, ‘K ontingente Naturgeschehnisse,’ Studia mediewistyczne 18 (1977), 3-70 and in W. A. 
Wallace, ‘Aquinas on the Temporal Relation Between Cause and Effect,’ Review of Metaphys­
ics 27 (1974) 569-84. Interesting passages of earlier medieval authors on miracles and the 
common course of nature are presented in B. W ard, Miracles and the Medieval Mind: Theory 
Record and Event 1000-1215 (London 1982) 3-33. A second objection to the exposition by 
Bottin, La scienza (notably on p. 214) is th a t he gives the impression th a t B uridan’s remarks 
about the evidentia ex suppositione communis cursus naturae have something in common with 
the hypothetico-deductive methodology of modern science. Buridan, however, is not advocat­
ing here th a t one should pose hypotheses in the sense of hypothetical syllogisms or th a t he 
adm itted ‘an order of hypothetical necessity’ as Moody, ‘Ockham, B uridan’ 154, has put it. 
For criticism of this position see W. A. Wallace, ‘Buridan, Ockham, Aquinas: Science in the 
Middle Ages,’ The Thomist 40 (1976) 481-82 and Maier, ‘Das Problem ’ 403 n. 65. A good 
survey of the different meanings of the expression ex suppositione and the Aristotelian roots of 
this notion is provided in W. A. Wallace, ‘Aristotle and Galileo: The Use of vnodeaig (Suppo­
sitio) in Scientific Reasoning,’ in Studies in Aristotle (ed. D. J . O’Meara; Washington 1982) 
47-77.
53 Cf. Weinberg, Nicholas 91-93.
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A last problem must be clarified. Why was it so im portant for Buridan to 
meet the arguments th a t denied the possibility of causal knowledge? The 
importance he attached to the problem may be seen in the fact th a t he devoted 
the whole of question 4 to this refutation. The answer is rather simple. As we 
have already seen, Buridan agreed with the Aristotelian notion of science. 
According to the Aristotelian view a thing is scientifically known when its 
causes are known (Anal. Post.,71M0-12):
Scire autem opinamur unumquodque simpliciter, sed non sophistico modo 
quod est secundum accidens, cum causam cognoscere arbitramur propter 
quam est res, quoniam illius est causa, et non contingere hoc aliter se habere.54
The claim of his opponents, however, th a t all demonstrations should be reduc­
ible to the primum principium  would render such causal explanations impos­
sible.
It was in this context th a t Buridan enunciated his second difficulty (B): 
‘Quae res sint causae vel ilia principia et quae res sint etiam ilia principiata vel 
causata?’55
His conclusions make it clear th a t for Buridan the principle of causality is 
active on two levels. On the first level, the knowledge of the premisses in any 
demonstration (quia or propter quid) is the cause of the knowledge of the 
conclusion, and this cause is an efficient cause.56 On the second level, the 
relation between cause and effect both in a demonstration quia and in a dem­
onstration propter quid is founded on the res which are known. That is to say, 
there is a habitudo causae ad causatum on the level of things in reality. (Mathe­
matical demonstrations are an exception to this rule. They are called propter 
quid, because in them inference is made from propositions which are better 
known to us by nature to propositions which are less known to us.)57
54 Aristoteles Latinus, Analytica Posteriora 71M 0-12 (edd. in thè translation of William of 
Moerbeke by L. Minio-Paluello & B. G. Dod [Bruges/Paris 1968] 268).
55 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6ra); cf. above.
56 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6ra): Secunda conclusio est quod in omni demonstratione — sive quia, 
sive propter quid — scientia praemissarum est causa scientiae conclusionis... et secundum 
Linconiensem huiusmodi causalitas est in genere causae efficientis.
67 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6rb): ‘Ego credo quod communiter in demonstrationibus mathematicis 
non est ex parte rerum significatarum per medium et per terminos conclusionis habitudo 
causae ad causatum vel econversa. Sicut est aliquando in naturalibus propter quid ita est in 
m athem aticis. . . .  Sed tam en illas demonstrationes mathematicas solemus vocare propter 
quid, quamvis ex parte rerum significatarum non sit habitudo aliqua causae ad causatum. 
Non enim solum attendim us ad causalitatem scientiae et ad scientiam et vocamus demonstra­
tionem propter quid quae procedit ex propositionibus naturaliter evidentibus et magis scitis 
ad propositiones dubitabiles et ignotas sciri per illas magis scitas, et sic est in mathematicis. 
Ubi autem ex parte rerum est habitudo causae ad causatum, nos aliter distinguimus demon­
strationem quia et propter quid, sicut ante dictum est.’
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Thus inferences of the existence of b from the existence of a must be allowed,
aliter etiam perirent demonstrationes verae et propriae propter quid, cum 
maxime propinqua sit et essentialis habitudo causarum ad causata, eo quo 
causata habent esse per causas et propter suas causas. Ideo, cum dictum sit 
quod ex scientia unius potest nobis fieri scientia alterius, hoc maxime debet 
concedi, quod ex scientia causarum potest nobis fieri scientia causatorum.58
The point is th a t a position according to which all scientific principles must 
be reduced to the primum principium  would lead to the destruction of science 
as it was conceived by Aristotle. The same thought was expressed some years 
later by Pierre d’Ailly:
Secundo sequitur, quod non posset sufficienter inferri ex una re alia nec ex 
causa posset concludi effectus nec e contra, et sic perirent omnes demonstra­
tiones naturales.59
III. C o n c l u s i o n
The passages of Nicholas of Autrecourt discussed here were taken, for the 
most part, from his Letters. As is well known, many theses taken from the 
Letters and from the Exigit were condemned in 1346. B ut Autrecourt pointed 
out to his judges th a t the doctrines proposed in the correspondence with Ber­
nard of Arezzo were stated disputatively. He had agreed with Bernard to take 
the primum principium  as the standard of certain knowledge and to explore 
where this would lead.60 It is difficult to decide whether Nicholas was sincere 
or this remark was merely a tactical maneuver. B ut neither of these possibili­
ties affects our exposition. My purpose has been to contrast two different
58 In  Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6rb). B uridan’s conviction th a t a relation exists between cause and 
effect is also expressed further on in the same question (fol. 6va): ‘Ubi autem esset determina­
tio per naturam  non concurrente actu libero voluntatis, ego crederem quod semper ex causis 
sufficientibus positis sequeretur effectus, nisi interveniret im pedim entum .’
59 Transcription in Maier, ‘Das Problem’ 411. The context of d’Ailly’s observation is: ‘quod 
loquendo de evidentia secundum quid seu conditionalis vel ex suppositione, scilicet stante Dei 
influentia generali et cursu naturae solito nulloque facto miraculo talia possunt esse nobis 
sufficienter evidentia, sic quod de ipsis non habemus rationabiliter dubitare.’ Doubting this 
kind of evidence would entail many inconveniences and absurdities, the second of which has 
been mentioned above.
60 Lappe, Nicolaus 35.17-25: ‘Beverendissimis patribus notum sit quod, quando magister 
Bernardus predictus et ego debuissem disputare, concordavimus ad invicem disputando 
conferre de primo consensu omnium principio, posito a philosopho quarto Metaphisice, quod 
est: “ Impossibile est aliquid eidem rei inesse et non inesse,” loquendo de gradu evidentie qui 
est in lumine naturali strictissimus. Istis suppositis dixi in predictis epistolis, eo quod tales 
conclusiones nec implicite continebant contradictionem nec explicite, u t tunc dicebam causa 
collationis. E t in hoc consistit totum  motivum quod tunc habui.’
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concepts of science, one which claimed th a t there is but one ultim ate principle 
of science, the primum principium, and another which claimed th a t there are 
nearly as many principles as there are conclusions.
We may, therefore, summarize the results to which these different options 
lead. One of the consequences of Autrecourt’s point of departure is th a t he 
must abandon the possibility of knowing causal relations. Neither experience 
nor logic is able to provide us with this kind of knowledge. A utrecourt’s strict 
conception of certitude entails the destruction of science in the Aristotelian 
sense. W hat remains is a science of mere tautologies, for only those inferences 
are evident in which antecedent and consequent are identical.
B uridan’s position is Aristotelian. He leaves intact the possibility of know­
ing causal chains, and for this reason he is able to assert th a t there are many 
indemonstrable principles of sciences which may be known by way of induc­
tion. His assumption of the existence of causal routines is in reality an a priori 
assumption. B ut it is a necessary assumption for maintaining the possibility of 
induction. The very same presupposition underlies the maxims th a t Scotus 
and Ockham formulated to render inductively known principles indubitable. 
At the same time, it is by way of induction th a t causal routines are discovered, 
or perhaps better, th a t reality is structured along causal chains.
I hope to have thrown a little light on the way induction and causality were 
intertwined in the fourteenth-century debate. I m ust reject Maier’s portrayal 
of this debate. I have tried to argue not only th a t a direct confrontation 
between Autrecourt and Buridan never took place, but also th a t their opinions 
diverged primarily because of Autrecourt’s refusal to make gratuitous assump­
tions about causality. The standards he set for certain knowledge do not allow 
him to make such presuppositions. Some anonymous, or perhaps illusive, op­
ponents of Buridan seem to have held the same standards. Buridan attacked 
them because he saw these standards as a th rea t to the relation he supposed to 
exist between cause and effect, and therewith to the Aristotelian concept of 
science. I cannot say th a t the option Buridan has chosen is more rational, but 
it is certainly more Aristotelian and perhaps (as is often the case with Aristotel­
ian positions) more in accord with common sense. In daily life men arrange 
their experiences in conceptual frameworks of cause and effect. In doing so, 
they suppose th a t they are doing more than simply observing repetitions of a 
sequence of events. A utrecourt’s option was completely different. A dialogue 
between their two concepts of science is not really possible.
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